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Institutions, Structural Policies, and Economic Development: Evaluating the Interrelationships 
Between Rule Spaces for Developing Countries 
 
 
Jordan Pattison 
Grand Valley State University 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 The complex and varied nature of macroeconomic development has generated a large body of 
research concerned with identifying its root causes. There are many competing theories about the 
underlying determinants of variations in economic outcomes between states, including perspectives 
shaped around axiomatic factors such as geography, trade, and institutions. While each of these 
perspectives contributes to the overall understanding of the different trajectories of economic 
development observable across the globe, economic research has largely consolidated around the central 
role that institutions play in structuring individual and collective economic behavior.  
The institutional approach to economic development emphasizes how institutions shape economic 
outcomes by directing human behavior through the construction of rule spaces. Rule spaces describe the 
legal, political, social, and economic systems that constrain and encourage particular modes of action, and 
institutions create a rule space (see Scully, 1997). There exists a growing body of research that examines 
how structural policies, another example of a specific rule space, have shaped national economic 
outcomes. These studies use more precise metrics of business regulatory environments such as the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business database. This paper seeks to contribute to the institutional perspective of 
development with a novel consideration of how the overall institutional and structural policy 
environments affect variations in economic development. The purpose of this is paper to determine the 
relative effects of these two separate yet closely interrelated rule spaces on economic outcomes by 
observing variations between average income levels for developing and transition economies. 
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The proceeding review of the existing economic literature will begin with an overview of the 
competing perspectives of long-term macroeconomic development, establish the primary role of 
institutions, and explore the role of business regulatory policies within the broader institutional space. A 
careful review of the institutional and economic policy literature will work to determine the relative role 
that institutions and structural policies play in shaping economic outcomes. This review will directly 
inform the selection of appropriate empirical data for the construction of original and comprehensive 
indices to represent the institutional and structural policy environments for each state.  
By using these original indices, denoted as the Institutional Index (II) and the Structural Policy 
Index (SPI), this paper seeks to demonstrate how the interrelationship between institutions and specific 
economic policies affects variations in economic outcomes. Multiple regression models incorporating 
both indices as well as relevant controls will be used to determine global relationships between these 
variables and variations in average income levels. The regression analysis indicates that institutions and 
structural policies both have a statistically significant relationship to variations in income levels across a 
sample of 82 low- and middle-income states. Notably, they retain their significance when controlling for 
trade openness, income inequality, and one another. Statistically, the institutional environment has a 
stronger relationship to income levels. Additionally, the interaction between the II and SPI indicates that 
both good institutions and a quality business regulatory environment are necessary for optimal economic 
outcomes.  
After thoroughly exploring the relationships between the II, the SPI, and income levels, this paper 
will conclude with detailed case studies that illustrate how the global trends identified in the regression 
analysis manifest in a selection of four Sub-Saharan African states. The case studies that conclude this 
paper effectively demonstrate how the interaction between institutions and economic policy result in 
disproportionately varied income levels. Furthermore, the case studies demonstrate the importance of the 
institutional environment in the ability to adequately design and effectively implement economic policy. 
For these countries, the strength and viability of their institutions over time directly affected their ability 
to maintain political stability, design economic policy, and produce positive economic outcomes.  
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 
2.1    Geography, Trade, and the Primacy of Institutions 
In the past few decades, economic and political science research has largely consolidated around 
the central role of institutions in long term economic development. Douglass North, largely credited with 
the development and promotion of the institutional perspective in economics, originally defined 
institutions as “a set of rules, compliance procedures and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals” 
(1981, p.201-202). Subsequent research has bolstered this approach by demonstrating the positive 
economic effects of constitutional systems, the protection of property rights, and the rule of law (see 
Tornell, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Institutions establish the 
rules of the game that constrain the behavior of public and private actors. In their application to economic 
activity, institutions can be conceptualized as the economic, political, and legal infrastructures that 
incentivize productive economic behavior (North 2005). For example, if an investor is confident that their 
property will be protected by the state via legal institutions, and that an impartial court of law can resolve 
contract disputes, they are more likely to invest in capital and production. 
         Of course, institutions alone cannot explain the variations in economic outcomes between states. 
Another leading perspective is based on the role of geography. In this view, geographical variations in 
factors such as location and climate have played a leading role in shaping the economic realities that exist 
in the world today. Differences in climate, natural resources, neighboring states, access to transportation 
via waterways, and modes of agricultural production resulted in different technological, cultural, and 
ultimately economic trajectories between states (Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs, Mellinger, 1999). 
Another perspective emphasizes the role of trade liberalization and trade policy on economic growth and 
income levels (see Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Frankel and Romer 1999). In this view, the fundamental 
economic principles of specialization and comparative advantage provide the basis for both increased 
wealth and productive investment. This perspective holds that trade promotes market development and 
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the free transfer of capital, technology, and information between states, a process conducive to both short- 
and long-term economic development.  
         Naturally, these competing perspectives have generated a large body of research that has 
attempted to integrate these theories and reconcile the relative empirical effects of each within the broader 
development literature. These efforts have consistently pointed toward the primacy of institutions in 
explaining variations in long term macroeconomic development across the globe. Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001) have received substantial attention for their work in demonstrating the economic 
effects of institutions in former colonies as a function of settler mortality. They demonstrated that, while 
differences in geographical realities have played a role in the choice and development of institutions, 
these factors become insignificant when controlling for the effects of institutions in explaining variations 
in income levels.  
In another particularly important contribution, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) examine 
the relative effects of geography, institutions, and trade on income levels around the globe by using an 
instrumental variable method. They found that, when controlling for the role of institutions, geography 
and trade become largely insignificant in explaining variations in income levels across states. Like 
Acemoglu et al., they note that geography is significant to the extent that it has influenced the 
development of institutions, but maintained that institutions were primary in driving economic outcomes. 
Additionally, they found that trade liberalization was only effective in generating positive economic 
activity when proper institutional frameworks created a productive policy space. This finding, that the 
positive gains of trade liberalization are captured in the presence of good institutional governance, is 
echoed by the work of other scholars (Chang et al., 2009; Gnangnon, 2019).  
In sum, the literature suggests that institutions play the primary role in determining economic 
outcomes. It is not that geography and trade do not matter, but instead that their relative effects on income 
levels become insignificant when controlling for the effects of institutional factors. 
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2.2    Democracy and Development  
         The consensus around the primacy of institutions has created significant interest in determining 
which underlying institutional structures and characteristics are most conducive to growth. Subsequently, 
an enormous body of research has materialized around the relationship between democracy and 
development, which has mostly promoted the idea that democratic governance provides the optimal 
institutional framework for positive economic outcomes (see Wittman, 1989; Clague et al., 1996; Pitlik 
and Worth 2003). In his book Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman (1982) argues that civil liberties 
and political rights are a prerequisite for economic freedom and therefore productive economic activity.  
Similarly, Benyishay and Betancourt find that there is a robust causal relationship between the presence 
of civil liberties and positive economic growth. In a strong argument for the compatibility of democracy 
and development, Olson Mancur (1993) argues that the institutional conditions necessary for securing 
individual rights such that economic potential within a society is maximized are the exact same conditions 
needed to maintain a long lasting and peaceful democratic system. He argues that political authority can 
only be sustainable to the extent that it is peaceful and transitional, which requires institutional protections 
for free speech, property rights, and equality under the law, and that these same institutions are 
prerequisites for productive economic activity. The underlying current of this perspective is that 
democratic capitalism promotes economic freedom and necessarily contains the exact legal and political 
institutions necessary for individuals to invest and produce confidently and efficiently. 
         Despite the strong case for a direct and positive relationship between democracy and economic 
development, there are two arguments that run counter to this paradigm. This first is that there is not a 
clear and direct theoretical or empirical relationship between democratic political systems and 
institutionally based economic growth. In what is often referred to as the “Conflict Perspective,” scholars 
argue that special interest groups such as large corporations exert undue political pressure to promote self-
serving policy aims that compromise socially optimal economic objectives (Olson, 1982). Additionally, 
democracies have a tendency towards redistributive social welfare policies, which allocates economic 
resources away from more productive activities via income transfers (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). That 
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democracies tend towards redistribution at the expense of economic development is supported by the 
work of Robert Barro (1996) and Przeworski and Limongi (1993), among others.  
         The second argument against the direct relationship between democracies and institutionally 
based growth is based on the apt observations that there are a number of non-democratic states that have 
adopted specific institutions and policies to achieve impressive economic outcomes. One of the most 
prominent examples is the variation in economic development experienced by North and South Korea 
following the end of the Korean War. As detailed by Glaeser et al., South Korea experienced substantial 
economic growth following the war, largely due to the market reforms and property rights enacted by 
South Korea’s dictators (2004). North Korea did not adopt any such policies and remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world today. Other examples include authoritarian China’s success in lifting 
millions out of poverty since the 1980s, or present-day Singapore and Vietnam. 
         While there may be a link between democracy and growth, democracy is clearly not a 
prerequisite for economic development, and differences in economic policy choices can have an effect 
within a variety of institutional environments. These findings seem to suggest that the character of the 
political system is much less important than what institutions and policies that political system selects, 
and how these institutional and policy choices affect economic outcomes. To further understand how 
institutional and policy choices affect variations in long term development, it is now useful to discuss an 
increasingly significant component of the institutional literature: structural policies. 
 
2.3    The Rise of Structural Policies 
Before discussing the empirical support for the economic role of structural policies in 
development, it is important to differentiate between structural policies and institutions. Structural 
policies are remarkably similar to institutions in their effect, in that they both create systems of rules that 
inform individual and collective economic behavior. North, among others, recognized that the reason that 
institutions have such a profound effect on economic development is because they simultaneously 
constrain behavior that would disincentivize investment and production, such as crime or national 
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expropriation of property, and encourage behavior that promotes investment and production, such as the 
accumulation of human and physical capital, by lowering assumed risk and transaction costs. Structural 
policies, therefore, are economic policies that lower transaction costs in investment and production, which 
encourages a more productive use of capital in well-regulated markets, ultimately driving economic 
growth. The operational difference between structural policies and institutions is derived from the way 
institutions “constrain” the behavior of individuals, organizations, and rulers or regimes. Structural 
policies are those “institutions” which more accurately represent choices made by governments or 
dictators. To this end, they do not necessarily constrain the behavior of dictatorial regimes over time, as 
policy is much more flexible and easier to change that institutional structures. For example, the choice of 
a single party regime to protect property rights represents the adoption of a structural policy, while 
constitutional restraints on executive authority represents the presence of a robust political and legal 
institution. 
This paper is certainly not the first to recognize the important role of structural policies in 
institutional environments, and how they independently affect economic development. In an eleven-year 
panel analysis, Eicher and Schreiber (2010) conducted a natural experiment of twenty-six former Soviet 
states that transitioned from communism to capitalism, evaluating the effect of structural policies in their 
economic transition. They found that the development of political institutions via structural policies was 
strongly correlated with economic growth, and that this finding was robust when adjusting the dependent 
variable or including public policy variables as controls. Glaeser et al (2004) find the adoption of 
structural policies to be a primary mechanism by which poor states increase their economic standing, and 
that a number of autocratic states have attained impressive economic outcomes through the 
implementation of good economic policies.  
Several scholars have utilized measures of the overall policy environment to demonstrate that 
economic policies that promote a more business friendly regulatory environment are strongly linked to 
improved economic outcomes (Djankov et al. 2004, Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). In the same thread, 
Gillanders and Whelan argue that the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business dataset, which measures the 
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degree to which regulatory environments facilitate business activity in nearly every country since the 
early 2000s, is a better explanatory variable for variations in income levels between states than traditional 
measures of legal and political institutions (2014). In their analysis, which compares the Doing Business 
Global Rank to an institutional measure of the rule of law and other relevant control variables such as 
trade openness, they find that the Doing Business indicator is an important factor in explaining variations 
in GDP per capita across a sample of over 100 states. Clearly, economic policy choices play a vital role in 
shaping economic outcomes, even when controlling for the effects of institutions and other relevant 
factors.  
 
 2.4 Revisiting Institutional Analysis 
To summarize, institutional economic analysis emphasizes the central role of political and legal 
institutions in shaping individual and collective action by constraining behavior to a system of rules, 
norms, and compliance procedures. Structural policies, which can exist alongside or independent of 
institutional frameworks, manifest incentive structures for productive economic activity that can be 
effectively utilized within a variety of political and economic systems. While both of these rule spaces 
have each been empirically linked to variations in income levels between states, there is also evidence 
that they have a differential effect on income levels (CITATION). The relationship between institutions 
and structural policies remains unclear, and additional work is needed to properly disentangle the effects 
of each factor from the other. Of the work reviewed thus far, Gillanders and Whelan have demonstrated a 
particularly thoughtful approach to disaggregating the effects of the institutional and structural policy 
environments, primarily through the use of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business metric. This paper 
seeks to extend that work by delineating between the effects of institutions and business regulatory 
policies and by examining how they interact to produce superior economic outcomes.   
 
 
 
9 
 
III. Research Design 
 
3.1  Research Design  
The literature review yields a few important conclusions. The first is that institutions are 
correlated and causally linked to variations in income levels between states. The second is that structural 
policies such as those represented in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Score are correlated and 
causally linked to variations in income levels between states. This paper seeks to isolate precise and 
comprehensive measures of the institutional and structural policy environments, examine their relative 
effects on income levels, and explore how the interaction of these two factors manifests in superior 
economic outcomes.  
To do this, this paper will employ both quantitative regression analysis and qualitative case study 
analysis. While most research focuses on either statistical analysis or case studies, these approaches are 
limited, respectively, by a lack of descriptive ability for any given state or from the inability to generate 
global generalizations. Using a combination of analytical methods, I am able to illustrate the findings of a 
rigorous statistical analysis with detailed descriptions for actual states. In addition to a mixed methods 
approach, this paper offers a novel contribution by constructing original indices to measure both the 
institutional and structural policy environments in a cross-country analysis, and restricting the observed 
sample to non-high-income states.   
 
3.2 A Novel Approach to Rule Space Measurement  
Adequately evaluating the relative effects of institutions and structural policies on economic 
outcomes requires a careful selection of data. In the case of institutions, in particular, not all research has 
been precise in designating which data measures perceptions or outcomes and which data measures the 
rules of the game, which is more appropriate to the study of institutional rule spaces. Again, the operative 
component of institutions is that they constrain all behavior, including that of government and dictators, 
to the extent that they are designed to do so. In contrast, structural policies represent choices made by 
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legislatures, parties, governments, or rulers. Therefore, this paper will attempt to carefully identify and 
measure those precise components that represent the framework of institutional environments and the 
substance of structural policy spaces by constructing original and comprehensive indices for both the 
institutional and structural policy environments.  
Employing an original index of the institutional environment serves to establish a complete 
picture of the total institutional structure present within each country that includes measurements of the 
rule of law, civil liberties, political rights, and property rights. While there are many sources of data that 
provide quality measurements of specific components of the institutional environment, it is useful to 
develop an index that encompasses a range of theoretically and empirically supported components, such 
that a comparison to the structural policy environment minimizes both conceptual overlap and gaps in 
conceptual coverage of the total rule space within each country. This approach will produce a somewhat 
novel evaluation of the institutional environment, while still allowing for disaggregation to determine the 
relative role of each component.  
The use of an originally constructed index of the structural policy environment is useful for 
several reasons, including specificity, construct validity, and the applicability of findings to both 
researchers and policymakers. Much of the existing literature that addresses the economic effects of 
policy environments rely upon composite measures of the total structural policy environment, which are 
often based on perceptions of the quality of a policy environment. Examples of this include metrics from 
the World Governance Indicators such as Regulatory Quality, which measures “perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development” (World Governance Indicators). This and other metrics, such as the Heritage 
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index, provide an excellent overview of the quality of any given policy 
environment, but they do not provide a direct insight into the effects of specific policies. 
Additionally, there are a number of mitigating factors that may impact the effects, perceptions, or 
outcomes of structural policies, important among them such factors as corruption and state capacity. To 
this end, measuring outcomes or perceptions of the total structural policy space alone is a flawed 
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approach, as the effects of these confounding variables may compromise the ability to measure the actual 
effects of structural policies. Instead, only specific and tangible policies will be included in an index of 
the structural policy environment on the merit of their existence. While no research design is perfect, this 
approach will avoid the measurement problems related to the variables described above. This serves to 
not only ensure greater construct validity, but to provide insight into how specific policies may impact 
economic outcomes such that the findings of this paper may be of particular utility to not just other 
researchers, but to policymakers as well. It is expected that both the Institutional Index and Structural 
Policy Index will be statistically significant predictors of variations in income levels for non-high-income 
states. Furthermore, it is expected that Institutions will have stronger relationship to income levels.  
To avoid measuring perceptions, and to best capture the whole of the institutional environment 
and the existence of actual structural policies, this paper will construct and utilize an Institutional Index 
(II) and Structural Policy Index (SPI), drawing from a comprehensive range of specific policy and 
institutional measurements. For a complete description of the methods and variables used for each index, 
see Appendix A.  
 
3.3 Evaluating the Indices  
To evaluate the relative effects of the II and the SPI on national income levels, each index will be 
incorporated into a series of regression models that will control for a number of relevant factors 
empirically and theoretically linked to variations in income levels. These models will be applied in a 
cross-national analysis of 82 countries. The dependent variable, average national income level, will be 
represented by the average GDP per capita from 2010 to 2018 for each state. The income level is 
averaged from 2010 to 2018 because the selection of any one year may represent a recession or a boom, 
and therefore would not be indicative of the general income level of a given state. The II and SPI will be 
constructed by using data from 2009, so that the causal effect of each index can be attributed to its 
occurrence prior to the observed time frame for the dependent variable.  
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The broad conceptual range of the II and SPI, which includes legal, political, economic, and 
institutional variables, constrains the available sources of data for control variables to data outside of 
those conceptual scopes. Furthermore, selecting control variables for multiple linear regression involves a 
careful process wherein the internal validity of the model is not violated by the simultaneous presence of 
two or more variables that are causally linked to another variable in the model. To avoid these potential 
sources of measurement error, the control variables were selected on the basis of conceptual distinction 
and independence from the II and SPI. The primary control variable for this section will be the degree of 
economic globalization as measured by actual economic flows from the KOF Globalisation Index. This 
variable measures economic activity and does not directly measure institutions or policies while 
simultaneously capturing the effects of trade, which theoretically “competes” with institutions and 
economic policy in explaining economic outcomes. The second control variable will be the level of 
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient for disposable income, provided by the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database. Income inequality creates barriers to macroeconomic 
development by limiting access to resources, and its salience in developing states makes it important to 
study in any case. Additionally, an interaction term will be used to determine whether there is an effect on 
income levels from simultaneous variations in the II and SPI. Data for the control variables will also come 
from 2009.  
 
3.4 Index Deconstruction 
 
Following the multiple regression analysis will be a section that uses stepwise regression to 
determine which components of the II and SPI have the strongest relationship to variations in income 
levels between states. This section will demonstrate how each aspect of both the II and SPI correlate with 
economic outcomes when controlling for all components of the index. These findings will directly inform 
the focus of the case studies.  
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3.5  Case Studies 
Finally, this study concludes with four qualitative case studies that build directly from the 
findings of the quantitative analysis, to further explore how differences in the institutional and structural 
policy environments affect variations in economic outcomes between states. High and low score 
categorizations on both the II and the SPI will be used to select case studies of four sub-Saharan African 
countries. The structure and content of these case studies will be further elaborated upon in a later 
section.  
 
3.6  Country Selection for Cross-National Analysis 
 
As stated, this paper will examine the effects of rule spaces in specifically non-high-income 
states. This approach recognizes that it is important to differentiate between the economic circumstances 
of different levels of economic development. In a study of the interrelationships between rule of law, 
democracy, and trade openness, Rodrik and Rigobon found that higher income levels tended to produce 
better institutions, suggesting that states that are more developed are more likely to have better institutions 
as a function of their relatively high level of economic development (2005). As such, institutions and 
structural policies that can be demonstrated as conducive to positive economic outcomes for developed 
states cannot be automatically assumed to have similar positive effects in less developed countries. The 
effects of rule spaces on income levels in high income states is not likely to be indicative of the effects of 
rule spaces in lower income states, due to the confounding effects of factors such as education, public 
health, technological development, financial sector development, and public infrastructure, among others. 
An effort to control for all these factors would unnecessarily complicate any quantitative approach and 
reduce the significance and validity of any findings. 
The status of “non-high income” will be determined using the World Bank’s income 
classifications as a guide, such that countries with a Low, Lower Middle, or Upper Middle income 
classification are included in the sample, and High income states are excluded. Due to the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of these income groupings, and in light of the fact that many of the richest high income 
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countries have a GDP per capita that more than doubles the income level of the poorer high income 
countries, the upper limit to be considered a non-high-income state was adjusted in this paper from an 
average income of around $12,000 as prescribed by the World Bank to an average income of $15,000. 
The goal is not to include only the least developed countries, but simply to exclude those countries that 
have reached a level of development that makes their economic conditions fundamentally different from 
the rest of the world. Therefore, this paper uses a sample of 82 non-high-income states from across the 
globe. Countries were originally selected on the basis of their 2009 income level per the World Bank, and 
retained on the basis of data availability. Appendix B provides a listing of the states included in the 
statistical analyses. 
 
IV. Quantitative Analysis 
 
4.1    Multiple Regression Models for Income 
 To evaluate the relationship between the II, SPI, and income levels, the following model was 
constructed: 
Y = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(II) + 𝛽2(SPI) + 𝛽3(EconGBZ) + 𝛽4(GINId) + 𝛽5(Int) + Ɛ  
 
where Y is the average GDP per capita from 2010-2018, II represents the Institutional Index value from 
2009, SPI is the Structural Policy Index value from 2009, EconGBZ is the degree of Economic 
Globalization as emasured by actual trade flows for 2009, GINId is the Gini Coefficient, Disposable 
Income for 2009, and Int is an interaction term representing the product of the II and SPI values for 2009.  
 While the above model describes the full model, several intermediate models were run to 
demonstrate how the relationship between the different variables to each other and to the dependent 
variable, income level, vary under different testing conditions. This enables an observation of how the 
control variables and interaction term shape the relationship between the II, SPI, and national income. 
These models, including their estimates and other relevant statistics, are detailed in Table 1 below.  
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 Models 1, 2, and 3 clearly indicate that both the II and SPI have statistically significant effects on 
income levels, even when controlling for trade openness or income inequality. Furthermore, these first 
three models yield respectable Adjusted R -Squared values of 0.4121, 0.4498, and 0.4389, indicating that 
these models reliably explain approximately 41, 44, and 43% of the total variation in income levels for 
this sample of states. Furthermore, all VIF values, none of which are higher than 1.69, indicate that there 
is a very low degree of multicollinearity present in any of the three models. This suggests that the II and 
SPI have met the standard of conceptual distinctness laid out in the research design, and can reliably be 
compared in the same model to one another, the control variables, and income levels.  
Model 5 shows that when both controls are active in the model, the II retains a statistically 
significant estimate at the .001 alpha level that corresponds to an increase in average GDP per capita of 
$95.97 for every one-point increase on the II. This corresponds to an increase in GDP per capita of nearly 
$960 for a ten-point increase on the II, which would represent a dramatic increase in the standard of living 
for a lower income country. Similarly, the SPI proves to be a statistically significant predictor of national 
income levels in this model, with an estimate that is robust at the .01 alpha level. This estimate indicates 
that a one-point increase in the SPI value for a country would correspond to a $110.07 increase in the 
average national income, or an increase in just over $1,100 for a ten point increase. Considering that the 
average GDP per capita in 2009 for all 82 states in this sample was just over $3,500, these estimates 
suggest that even a small increase in either the II or SPI would represent a significant change in the 
average national income over an 8 year period. Furthermore, Model 5 can explain approximately 49% of 
the variation in income levels for this sample, with low VIF values, indicating that this is a very 
statistically sound model.  
The inclusion of an interaction term in Models 4 and 6 fundamentally changes the observed 
relationship between the II, SPI, and income level. In Model 4, the interaction term changes the 
relationship between the II and SPI and the income level from positive to negative, and neither estimate 
retains their statistical significance. Additionally, the interaction term estimate does achieve statistical 
significance at the .05 alpha level. These characteristics are also true for Model 6, which incorporates 
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both the trade openness and income inequality controls into what becomes the full and final model. While 
it should be noted that the estimate for the interaction term is very small, such that a one point increase in 
the interaction term value corresponds to only about a $4.00 increase in average income level, the 
interaction between the II and SPI still renders the effect of either index on income levels insignificant. 
Additionally, this model is the strongest out of the six models, with an Adjusted R Squared value 
indicating that Model 6 can explain approximately 51.3% of all variation in average income level for this 
sample.  
Table 1: Modeling Variations in Income Levels 
Dependent Variable: Average GDP per capita, 2010 to 2018    
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept -7,597.77*** 
(1760.28) 
-8,800.47*** 
(1820.92) 
-1875.43 
(2542.96) 
2490.417 
(4929.57) 
-3254.38 
(2697.17) 
6776.166 
(5557.005) 
Institutional Index 81.93** 
(24.70) 
84.95*** 
(24.31) 
92.78** 
(23.82) 
-150.532 
(109.155) 
95.97*** 
(23.71) 
-119.205 
(107.424) 
Structural Policy 
Index 
159.48*** 
(39.57) 
112.07* 
(43.12) 
153.94*** 
(37.75) 
-39.039 
(98.79) 
110.07** 
(41.44) 
-62.979 
(93.605) 
Economic 
Globalization 
 
58.93** 
(21.69) 
  
49.99* 
(21.11) 
38.24● 
(21.449) 
Gini Coefficient, 
Disposable Income 
  
-141.17** 
(47.14) 
 
-128.40** 
(47.52) 
-141.298** 
(46.597) 
Interaction Term 
(II*SPI) 
   
4.401* 
(2.015) 
 
4.069* 
(1.983) 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.4121 0.4498 0.4389 0.4659 0.4919 0.5128 
Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) 
1.41, 1.41 1.44, 1.69, 
1.23 
1.44, 1,41, 
1.03 
28.85, 9.21, 52.03 1.48, 
1.69, 
1.26, 1.06 
31.76, 8.97, 
1.35, 1.08, 
56.74 
Notes: N = 82. Standard Errors in parentheses. ●, *, **, and *** correspond with p-values at the 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, and 0.001 
significance levels, respectively. VIF values are reported in order of appearance in the table. 
 
The effect of the interaction term suggests that the simultaneous presence of strong institutional 
and structural policy environments may result in higher income levels than for a state that only excels in 
one area of the overall rule space. It may be the case that strong institutions and good economic policies 
may both be necessary to produce optimal economic outcomes, and that neither is sufficient to achieve 
these ends. However, the small estimate generated by the interaction term suggests that this effect is quite 
small. Simple correlation coefficients indicate that the Interaction term is more strongly correlated with 
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average national income than either the II or SPI, with a value of 0.657, compared to values of 0.556 and 
0.588 for the II and SPI, respectively. To illustrate how this relationship manifests in actual countries, the 
following section will include four in depth case studies. Prior to the case studies, the relationship 
between the components of the II, SPI, and income levels will first be examined.  
 
4.2 Stepwise Analysis of Index Components 
 To further understand the relationship between the II, SPI, and income levels, it is useful to break 
down the components of each index and examine the relationship between these sub-indicators and 
income levels. This process will shed light on which specific aspects of the overall institutional and 
structural policy environments best explain variations in income levels. The process of backwards 
stepwise analysis involves the full list of sub indicators for a given index being compared to the average 
GDP per capita from 2010 to 2018 for each state in a multiple linear regression. Then, the variable with 
the largest p-value is removed based on its low statistical significance in explaining differences in income 
levels. This process is repeated until the only remaining variables are those that can demonstrate a 
statistical significance within the model to at least the 0.05 alpha level.  
 The process of stepwise analysis for the Institutional Index produces a model wherein the 
variables for Civil Liberties and Property Rights are retained in the model as the most statistically 
significant. This suggests that these variables have the strongest relationship to income levels out of the 
components that make up the II. This is consistent with the institutional literature, which heavily 
emphasizes the role of both property rights and civil liberties in driving long term economic growth. It 
should be noted that the political rights variable was not retained in the model, offering some evidence to 
the perspective that democracy generally or political rights specifically may not be as important to long 
term economic development. For a table detailing the numerical results of the II backwards stepwise 
analysis, please see Appendix C.  
 The backwards stepwise analysis for the Structural Policy Index indicated that the ease of Getting 
Credit, Trading Across Borders, and Enforcing Contracts were the most statistically significant 
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components in terms of explaining variations in income levels between states. These policy areas are 
closely related to several empirically demonstrated factors that shape economic development, including 
financial development, trade policy, and efficient court systems. Not surprisingly, these factors are at the 
core of the economic theory around development and reemphasize those policy areas that will likely 
continue to be the focus of additional research and policy decisions. For a table detailing the numerical 
results of the SPI backwards stepwise analysis, please see Appendix C.  
 
V. Case Studies 
The following case studies provide a detailed analysis of four Sub-Saharan African states, 
demonstrating how the global trends identified in the regression analysis manifest in actual countries. 
These case studies will primarily focus on the institutional structures of each country, for a few important 
reasons. The first reason extends from the previous finding that there is a strong and direct relationship 
between the institutional environment and income levels across states, and that this relationship is more 
robust than for structural policies. For each of the proceeding case studies, there are clear and direct 
causal linkages between the trajectory of their institutional development and their economic success. 
Secondly, the institutional environment develops over decades or even centuries, as do income levels, and 
each case study includes a detailed analysis of the institutional history of the state over time. Nonetheless, 
structural policies do play an important role in shaping economic outcomes, and their role will be 
examined for each case.  
It is expected that there will be an interaction effect from the simultaneous presence of either 
notably high or particularly low values on both the II and the SPI. Table 5a below illustrates these 
expectations. It should be noted that the income designations, i.e., “High income,” are not exact income 
designations that align with the income thresholds such as those provided by the World Bank. Instead, 
they provide an approximate benchmark that is relative to this sample, which is composed of low- and 
middle-income states. This diagram simply describes the variation in income expected by high and low 
scores on the II and SPI, collectively. 
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Table 5b: Case Study Summary Indicators 
Summary Indicators Botswana  
II: H; SPI: H 
Lesotho  
II: H; SPI: L 
Zambia 
II: L; SPI: H 
Uganda 
II: L; SPI: L 
Avg GDP per capita, 2010-2018 $7,459 (1) $1,245 (3) $1,585 (2) $657 (4) 
Avg % annual GDP growth, 2010-2018 3.30 (1) 2.62 (2) 2.14 (3) 1.85 (4) 
Institutional Index 81.78 (1) 58.48 (2) 53.25 (3) 40.95 (4) 
Structural Policy Index 62.42 (1) 47.65 (4) 56.04 (2) 48.34 (3) 
Economic Openness 62.71 (2) 70.88 (1) 62.01 (3) 46.70 (4) 
Gini Coefficient 58.20 (4) 50.20 (2) 55.50 (3) 44.50 (1) 
Colonial Status British 
Protectorate 
British 
Protectorate 
British  
Colony 
British 
Protectorate 
 
Table 5c: Institutional Index Indicators 
Institutional Index Indicator Botswana Lesotho Zambia Uganda 
Rule of Law 92 64 69 48 
Property Rights 75 40 30 30 
Freedom Index Score 78 71 61 45 
Freedom Index: Political Rights 30 30 26 15 
Freedom Index: Civil Liberties 48 41 35 30 
 
Table 5d: Structural Policy Index Indicators 
Structural Policy Indicator Botswana Lesotho Zambia Uganda 
Starting a Business 68.09 75.86 82.86 57.23 
Construction Permits 53.42 39.04 61.41 39.24 
Registering Property 81.99 51.84 64.93 55.83 
Getting Credit 62.50 37.50 56.25 37.50 
Protecting Minority Investors 60.00 36.67 56.67 46.67 
Paying Taxes 78.09 69.72 73.65 71.20 
Trading Across Borders 43.61 43.40 18.60 29.03 
Enforcing Contracts 52.14 46.84 57.53 54.15 
Resolving Insolvency 61.92 27.94 32.49 44.23 
 
 Table5a: Income Expectations 
  Institutional Index 
  High Low 
Structural 
Policy 
Index 
High High income 
  Lower 
middle 
income 
Low 
Lower 
middle 
income 
Low 
income 
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The three tables above demonstrate how the differences in economic success for each state aligns 
with their differences in institutional and structural policy environments. These four countries were 
chosen to represent each variation of high and low rankings for both the SPI and the II, and because of 
their common history of direct or indirect British rule and their shared regional location. Choosing 
countries with a shared colonial history and a shared location precludes the need to control for different 
geographical circumstances or colonial influences, such that the variables of interest can be studied more 
directly. Each case study provides a different insight into how institutions shape economic outcomes, and 
collectively they demonstrate just how instrumental variations in institutional development are to 
economic success. 
It is important to note that Botswana not only scores the highest on the II and the SPI, but that it 
scores the highest in all sub indicators of the II, and most of the sub indicators of the SPI. While Uganda 
scores the lowest, Zambia and Lesotho have similar scores that are in the middle, with Lesotho scoring 
higher on the II and Zambia scoring higher on the SPI. Zambia’s higher income despite having a lower II 
score seemingly defies the global trend, but Zambia does have considerable natural resource wealth that 
may in part explain this disparity. In any case, these two countries serve as examples of states near the 
middle of the spectrum for both the II and SPI. Additionally, the scores of each country in the variables 
identified within the backward stepwise regression analysis –-property rights, civil liberties, getting 
credit, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts—track moderately well with the variations in 
income level for each country. Furthermore, the negative relationship between income inequality and 
incomes and the positive relationship between trade openness and incomes is evident for these states.  
It will be demonstrated that the institutional environment dominates the effects of economic 
policy. For example, in the case of Botswana, a stable institutional environment created a competent state 
that could effectively develop and enforce effective structural policies. In contrast, Uganda demonstrates 
how institutional failure and the resulting political dysfunction and violence prevents economic policy 
from being adequately designed and implemented. Zambia and Lesotho exist in between both extremes.  
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5.1 Botswana 
A country rich with natural resources, including diamonds, Botswana has benefited from a 
fortunate economic situation and produced impressive economic outcomes, boasting a national income 
level of $7,459 from 2010 to 2018, and an average GDP growth rate of 3.29% over that same time period. 
These impressive economic results correspond with Botswana’s relatively high II and SPI scores of 81.78 
and 62.42, respectively. Botswana is an exceptional country, not just among the four case studies of this 
paper, but among all of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and not just for these economic reasons. Unlike many 
SSA countries, Botswana has maintained a remarkably stable political environment, which has been 
almost entirely absent of civil war, violent conflict, government coups, or dictatorships in the past 
century.  
 
What makes Botswana exceptional, however, is not just its economic success or its political 
stability, but how these outcomes were achieved. For example, while Botswana’s extensive resource 
wealth is certainly a key contributing factor to its high income and steady growth rates, Botswana has 
escaped the perils of a phenomenon common to the African continent: the resource curse. A state is said 
to have a resource curse when a particularly profitable and plentiful natural resource (often oil) takes 
control of an economy, inhibiting investment in other industries and often resulting in widespread 
corruption in business and government. This has a particularly harmful effect on long term growth and 
political stability. In contrast to this pattern, Botswana has effectively avoided any level of consequential 
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corruption within government, and its vast mineral resources have become a source of funding for social 
welfare programs and provided the basis for widespread government investment in public goods.  
How has Botswana defied this pattern and succeeded today? This outcome is in large part due to 
Botswana’s political history, which includes a centuries long tradition of self-rule and local administrative 
control.  These institutions developed out of the practices of the smaller Tswana states that would 
combine to become modern day Botswana, continuing long standing traditions of creating tribal policy 
through an open access, civil discourse based system with a limited executive serving as chief by the 
consensus of the people  (Robinson, 2009). These institutions formed the mechanisms for crafting policy, 
resolving disputes, and maintaining social, economic, and political order (Booi and Fombad, 2015). 
These traditions of accountability and collaboration provided the basis for how future political and legal 
institutions would develop in Botswana, in spite of foreign interference. Despite being a British 
protectorate for nearly 80 years, these institutions were maintained, and even flourished during this time, 
as the British opted to allow for local administration and legal systems to prevail. As argued by Robinson, 
the continuity and evolution of these systems established norms and practices of good governance that 
became more concrete and effective over time.  
These institutions resisted patrimonialism and clientelism, led Botswana’s cattle-based elites to 
secure property rights, retained their effectiveness by changing in response to emerging threats and 
changing political circumstances, and provided the basis for the successful emergence of democratic 
systems in the 1950s and 1960s. Reforms led by Seretse Khama led to the establishment of a 
representative legislature in 1960 which was able to successfully and peacefully negotiate Botswana’s 
independence in 1966 (Commonwealth, 2020). These new democratic institutions grew directly out of 
and incorporated those traditional institutions which had existed and evolved in Botswana for centuries. 
This process of carefully combining modern democratic institutions with traditional tribal institutions 
resulted in a stable and successful multiparty democracy wherein authority has been successfully 
centralized. To this day, Botswana remains a stable democracy, with an executive president, a multiparty 
parliament, and a separate deliberative body composed of tribal leaders. 
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The development and implementation of Botswana’s economic policy benefited significantly 
from its strong institutions and its functional political system. The same traditions of private ownership, 
economic autonomy, and minimal state intervention that facilitated the development of strong institutions 
led Botswana to avoid patrimonial, state-controlled economic development that undermined stable growth 
in so many other transition economies in the latter half of the twentieth century (Commonwealth, 2020; 
Robinson, 2009). A strong civil society and a stable political environment led to the development of a 
number of state agencies such as the Botswana National Productivity Centre in 1993 and the Botswana 
Institute for Development Policy Analysis in 1995, which have consistently produced effective research 
to guide economic development policy (Hope, 1998). Furthermore, the creation of the Citizen 
Entrepreneurial Development Agency and the Local Enterprise Authority in 2004 have provided direct 
assistance to entrepreneurs through subsidized loans, training, and other support services (Hope, 1998). 
The success of these programs are evident in high global rankings among Doing Business indicators such 
as Starting a Business, Getting Credit, Registering Property, and Enforcing Contracts ever since data on 
these variables began in 2004 (World Bank).  
For Botswana, a tradition of strong institutions has provided the basis for political stability and 
national autonomy. This foundation has enabled a strong government to implement both political reforms 
and macroeconomic policies that explain why Botswana has been an economic success story not just in 
sub-Saharan Africa, but the world over. Botswana is a prime example of how strong institutions can 
provide the basis for political stability and the development of successful economic policy in a manner 
conducive to impressive advances in economic development. The interaction between Botswana’s 
institutions and structural policies are, without a doubt, a central factor in explaining its disproportionately 
high degree of economic success, in terms of both income levels and economic growth. 
5.2 Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is a small and mountainous country, landlocked by South Africa. A lower middle-income 
country as of 2009, Lesotho is a country of relatively high unemployment, poverty, inequality, and trade 
volume (Commonwealth, 2020). Lesotho’s average income level of merely $1,244.55 from 2010 to 2018 
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and an average GDP growth rate of 2.617% during the same period continues a trend of slow and unstable 
economic development that has been present since Lesotho’s independence in 1996.  
There are many reasons for this particular development trajectory, chief among them a political 
history characterized by instability and violence, which has posed a serious barrier to economic growth 
and development through a direct negative impact on administrative capacity, investment, and economic 
development. These failures of governance precipitated by political turmoil can be directly tied to the 
inability of Lesotho to construct and maintain robust institutions. 
The history of what was to become modern day Lesotho is best traced to King Moshoeshoe I, a 
tribal leader who forged the relationship with the British that established Lesotho’s status as a British 
Protectorate in 1868. While democratic reforms led to the development of the Basutoland National 
Council by 1960, an established constitution and elections by 1965, and national independence by 1966, 
Lesotho’s inability to transition into a functional democracy laid the foundation for nearly thirty years of 
political turmoil. One key reason for this failure can be linked to the gulf between the centralized, urban, 
democratic system that was erected, and a largely rural population who maintained their faith in 
traditional institutions of authority such as tribal chiefs and the royal family (Commonwealth, 2020). The 
failure to effectively integrate traditional sources of authority into the newly established institutional 
structure undermined the effectiveness and legitimacy of the new system.  
By 1970, a strained relationship between King Moshoeshoe II and Prime Minister Lebeau 
Jonathan led the PM to cancel the second round of national elections, suspend the constitution, and exile 
the King. Jonathan was overthrown in a military coup in 1986 by his second in coming Lekhanya, who 
himself was overthrown via coup in 1991. During this time, investment and economic development 
stagnated as a result of political instability, which existed as a direct result of the near constant subversion 
of all manner of legal and democratic institutions.  
A return to fair elections in 1993 seemed to set Lesotho on a new path, and with it an opportunity 
at real economic progress. However, the gains of the early 1990s were lost when a contested election in 
1997 led to mass protests, riots, looting, and significant property damage. It was not until an intervention 
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by international security forces acting under the auspices of the SADC, who clashed with mutinous 
contingents of the Lesotho Defense Forces, that stability was restored. Reforms to the 1993 constitution in 
2001 have mostly stabilized the political environment in Lesotho, although there was a need for SADC 
intervention in 2014 when the then-PM fled the country, claiming to fear for his life. 
Recent economic trends in Lesotho are in many ways a legacy of a past defined by institutional 
failures and the political dysfunction that existed because of that failure. Lesotho’s business environment 
has been described as overregulated, and its ability to secure private sector development is largely a 
function of its outdated economic policies and regulations (AFDB). For example, women only gained the 
right to transfer property and engage in legal transactions in November of 2006 (World Bank). Through 
2009, the year from which data for the SPI was drawn, government consent was still required to transfer 
private property.  
 
Slow and erratic growth has limited the trajectory of the more recent gains that have been made in 
Lesotho since the turn of the century, but gains have been made (see Figure 5b). Since 2004, Lesotho has 
made reforms that made it easier to pay taxes, start a business, and register property. The economic 
conditions of the modern day are defined in part by the impact of a number of World Bank and IMF 
programs within Lesotho, as well as initiatives such as the Highlands Water Development Project, which 
provides Lesotho with energy and an export of water to neighboring South Africa.  
Lesotho’s record of institutional instability and political dysfunction have stifled its development 
trajectory, and its poor business regulatory environment has made it difficult for entrepreneurs to start 
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business and contribute to economic growth and development. Nonetheless, more recent reforms in both 
the institutional and economic policy environments have produced mixed results that are trending in a 
positive direction for Lesotho. In this case yet again, the effect of both institutions and policies is evident 
in the economic trends observed for a developing country. 
5.3 Zambia 
Zambia has substantial resource wealth, including cobalt and copper, the latter of which it is 
Africa’s second largest exporter. It is also a country with high levels of poverty and inequality. Modern 
day Zambia is a functioning democracy, with an executive President and a parliament. This political 
system includes a strong constitution with an encoded bill of rights, elections with national suffrage, and 
since 2001 has been mostly stable and functional. However, for the first thirty or so years of Zambia’s 
independence, declining terms of trade for copper and political dysfunction brought about a steady 
decline in national income and low to negative growth rates. While much attention has been paid to the 
inopportune decline in copper prices that undermined Zambia’s primary economic industry, the 
fundamental failure of the newly independent state to adopt or develop functional institutions facilitated 
this economic downturn and in part explain the more recent economic trends explored in this paper. The 
blame for Zambia’s institutional struggles cannot be placed solely at the feet of the Zambian people or 
even the regime that ruled without opposition from 1973 through 1991. Instead, a combination of colonial 
legacies, a lack of institutional traditions and experiences, and political dysfunction acted together to 
undermine Zambia’s economic outcomes.  
From 1889, when the British South Africa Company obtained a Royal Charter to explore and 
develop what is now modern day Zambia, until 1964, when Zambia officially gained its independence, 
Zambia was under direct control by the British (Commonwealth, 2020). While Zambia was never fully 
colonized, the British established institutions for the express purpose of exploiting Zambia’s vast copper 
reserves. These extractive institutions tend to have a particularly harmful effect on the colony in which 
they are enacted, as resources are diverted almost exclusively towards infrastructures that exclude the 
native population, stifling shared economic diversification, growth, and sidelining local control over the 
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economy (du Plessis, 2006). In the case of Zambia, the exclusion of Zambians from these extractive 
institutions only meant that when they did achieve independence, they gained control of institutions they 
had no experience with and no tradition of, and these institutions happened to be the core of their 
economic system. The new ruling government was headed by Kenneth Kaunda, who came from the 
largest ethnic group in Zambia, the Bembe tribe. This tribe, and the Zambian people in general, were not 
equipped to adopt institutions necessary for the conduct of international trade, democratic government, 
and property rights, in part due to a lack of traditional experience with these institutions, and in part due 
to systemic exclusion from participation during colonial rule (Commonwealth, 2020).  
Exacerbating this reality was the imposition of single party rule by Kaunda’s UNIP for nearly 
twenty years. A monopoly on political power and the use of violence against dissidents produced 
persistent political unrest, including an attempted coup in 1981. This political system restricted policy 
options by stifling cooperation among ethnic groups, who lacked a shared political and social history but 
shared historical tensions. Further damage to the economy came from the partial or complete 
nationalization of many foreign owned industries, including the mining companies, which placed the 
Zambian government in significant debt when copper prices fell sharply, and revenues dried up (Chirwa 
and Odihiambo, 2015). As argued by Susanna du Plessis and echoed by this author, institutional failures 
exacerbated the effects of political incompetence and economic misfortune, ultimately undermining the 
ability of the newly independent nation to transition into a functional state capable of coordinating 
effective economic policy in the face of economic uncertainty.  
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By the 1990s, the UNIP allowed for the restoration of a multiparty democracy, which precipitated 
the rise of an opposition party, the MMD. A rewriting of the constitution in 1995 was followed by a 
controversial ratification by the National Assembly in June of 1996, prior to the elections that were to 
take place in November of that same year. Election boycotts by opposition parties precipitated further 
political instability, which would not see firm resolution until the turn of the 21st century, when the 
modern constitution, including a bill of rights and carefully defined political institutions for the national 
legislature and the executive, were established. It was not until after these reforms were made, and those 
strong political and legal institutions implemented, that Zambia began to see a rise in national income and 
consistently positive growth rates (See Figure 5c). Despite these institutional gains, Zambia’s economic 
development was continually stifled by a regulatory environment that required government consent to 
transfer property, lacked sufficient bankruptcy rehabilitation procedures, and made trading across the 
border particularly difficult (World Bank). Improvements in the ability to register property, pay taxes, and 
start a business by the end of the 2000s indicate that Zambia’s structural policy space is catching up to the 
institutional reforms that have led its economic turnaround. 
Zambia’s economic misfortunes in the latter half of the 20th century and its eventual turnaround 
can be attributed in no small part to the trajectory of its institutional environment. Since 2001, political 
stability and a functioning government have been able to adopt necessary economic policies, such as 
divestment of the Zambia National Commercial Bank, a state owned bank, which provided the funding 
for investment in economic diversification and export development (Commonwealth, 2020). Ultimately, 
the creation of a stable institutional environment has enabled the government to function properly and for 
the economy to make a significant turnaround, resulting in Zambia’s return to the middle income levels of 
the 1960s and more stable growth. 
 
5.4  Uganda 
 
 Uganda is located next to Kenya, in central Africa, and has a small economy traditionally 
dominated by an agricultural sector propped up by poor peasants. These farmers have struggled to access 
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credit and register property throughout Uganda’s history, lacking the knowledge and legal standing to 
utilize collateral for investment (Mpuga, 2010). While a poor business regulatory environment has 
plagued this SSA country, the story of Uganda is defined by decades of political unrest and violence that 
undermined its institutions and prevented any real economic development from occurring for nearly forty 
years after its independence. In the case of Uganda, widespread institutional failure undermined 
government function, policy reforms, and ultimately economic development.  
Following its independence in 1962, Uganda failed to establish institutions that consistently 
protected democratic systems and upheld the rule of law. By 1966, the first President, Milton Obote, had 
suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and abolished the traditional monarchies, effectively 
centralizing political power in a near complete elimination of Uganda’s political institutions. Obote was 
overthrown via military coup in 1971 by Idi Amin, who would abolish the national legislature and 
establish a dictatorship. During Amin’s rule, violence, repression, and property theft were government 
policy. Property belonging to the Jewish population was expropriated by the government, intellectuals 
were terrorized, and Asians were largely exiled, their businesses seized and handed over to senior military 
officials, who quickly ran their enterprises into the ground (Commonwealth, 2020). The economic 
collapse precipitated by the institutional failure was accompanied by a widespread moral collapse as well, 
with black markets, destruction of property, theft, murder, and rape becoming commonplace in Amin’s 
Uganda (Commonwealth, 2020).  
Amin would lose power after an invasion of Tanzania resulted in a military defeat that caused 
him to flee the capitol. This was followed by two short unsuccessful regimes which preceded an election 
in 1980 that returned Obote to power. A rejection of the election results led to ongoing civil war between 
government forces and the NRM, and Obote was overthrown and exiled by 1985. A new president and 
leading figure of the NRM, Yoweri Museveni, sought to restore economic and moral reconstruction to 
Uganda by launching the Economic Reform Program in 1986, which aimed to liberalize the economy and 
develop the tradable goods sector (Feltenstein and Sarangi, 2005). However, Museveni’s refusal to restore 
a multiparty system and ongoing armed conflict in northern Uganda undermined these efforts. Political 
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stability and economic progress were not restored until the mid 1990s, facilitated by a constitutional 
amendment in 1993 that restored the traditional monarchies and a new constitution in 1995. For the next 
15 years, Uganda largely maintained a precarious degree of political stability and function, but failed to 
uphold the rule of law and government authority in regions terrorized by the LRA, an armed militant 
group known for abducting children as soldiers and slaves and torturing their victims. A restoration in 
2005 of a multiparty democracy and coordinated military action which drove the LRA out of Uganda in 
2008 paved the way for a return to institutional structure and function in Uganda, and the economy 
experienced notable gains following these events (Commonwealth, 2020). While government corruption 
and elections characterized by voter suppression persist, the relative stabilization of political institutions 
and the rule of law has provided fertile ground for a significantly improved economic trajectory.  
 
Uganda’s development path since its independence has been shaped by an outright failure of 
political and government institutions and the rule of law. One ineffective government after the other 
resorted to subverting institutional structures and abandoning formal sources of legal and political 
authority, which facilitated nearly four decades of turmoil and violence. Throughout this time period, the 
positive effects of economic policy were limited by government failure, such that a poor business 
regulatory environment has persisted into the 2000s. Uganda’s institutional failure, political violence, and 
inability to protect private property and uphold the rule of law have contributed to an economic trajectory 
that stifled investment and growth. The interaction between failed institutions and the poor business 
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environment that they helped produce has resulted in stunted economic development for Uganda, 
characterized by its remarkably low income relative to the other cases examined above.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The findings of this paper tell us a number of things about institutionally based development and 
the role that structural policies play in that process. First and foremost, as has been illustrated elsewhere, 
institutions and economic policies have a direct causal relationship to long term economic development, 
and the relationship between institutions and incomes is particularly strong. This paper furthers these 
findings by demonstrating that indices representing a full measure of the institutional and structural policy 
environments have statistically significant relationships to income levels. Furthermore, the interaction 
between the II and the SPI itself has a small yet statistically significant effect on income levels, 
suggesting that neither institutions nor policies alone are sufficient to guarantee long term development 
success, and that the presence of both rule spaces may be necessary for optimal economic outcomes.  
 Additional analysis for each index indicated that a select few institutional and policy variables 
have a particularly strong relationship with income levels. Property Rights and Civil Liberties for the II 
and the ease of Getting Credit, Trading Across Borders, and Enforcing Contracts for the SPI are at the 
center of each indices’ relationship to variations in income levels. This suggests that the protection of 
property rights and the presence of strong civil liberties within a society are at the core of the institutional 
effect on long term development relevant to other important institutional factors. Similarly, the strong 
relationship between access to credit, international trade, and contract enforcement suggests that policy 
reforms in these areas of economic regulation may generate even more positive long-term development 
outcomes.  
 The case studies provide an interesting insight into the interaction between the institutional 
environment and economic policy in determining economic outcomes. In the case of Botswana, a 
remarkably successful institutional environment provided the political stability necessary for economic 
growth. On the other extreme, Uganda’s consistent failure to maintain any functional institutional 
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structure severely inhibited its growth over the latter half of the twentieth century. Zambia and Lesotho, 
who performed somewhere in the middle in terms of the II and SPI, had mixed results as a function of 
their unstable institutional environments that improved by the turn of the century. In all four cases, it is 
apparent that the strength and viability of the institutional environment played a direct role in the ability 
of the government to create and implement economic policy. These findings suggest that the role of 
institutional capacity may take precedence over that for economic policy.  
As with all research efforts, the data and methods used in this paper limit any exact empirical 
declarations. As previously mentioned, the SPI is constructed from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
data, which primarily covers the business regulatory environment, and therefore does not include any 
measure of fiscal or monetary policy. Additionally, there are a number of variables that were not directly 
controlled for, such as education or geography. While the case studies did make use of a number of 
additional controls, such as regional location and former colonial status, an examination of only four 
countries cannot be extrapolated across the globe. Therefore, additional research is needed to examine the 
trends identified in the regression analysis and the case studies. If there is a robust interaction effect 
between institutions and structural policies, additional research using time series analysis, additional 
control variables, or a larger sample of states might indicate such a relationship. Similarly, if institutional 
capacity predominates policy choices, as the case studies suggest, this would need to be observed in a 
larger sample of states.  
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to explore the relationships between the institutional and 
structural policy environments and income levels, to better understand what types of institutions and 
economic policy choices are linked to long term growth in national income. The fact that this paper 
observes these relationships for non-high-income states makes the findings of this paper particularly 
relevant to the development literature and to policymakers. Research in development economics and 
institutional analysis in political science must make the findings of academic research readily and directly 
applicable to the economic situations of those states which their research is the subject of. Additional 
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research that explores the potential avenues for exploration described above can contribute significantly 
to that effort.  
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Appendix A: Datasets, Variables, and Indices 
Table A1: Data Sources 
World Bank WB 
 Ease of Doing Business EoB 
 World Governance Indicators  WGI 
 World Development Indicators WDI 
UN Conference on Trade and Development  UNCTAD 
Varieties of Democracy  VDEM 
Heritage Foundation: Economic Freedom Index  EFI 
Freedom House: Freedom in the World  FIW 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database SWIID 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute: Globalisation Index KOF 
 
Table A2: Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent 
  
avGROWTH 
avGDPpc 
GDP growth rate, annual %, averaged from 2010-2018  
GDP per capita, averaged from 2010-2018, in 2010 USD 
UNCTAD 
WDI 
Explanatory  
  
Test  
  
SPI  
II 
Structural Policy Index  
Institutional Index 
See Below 
See Below 
Control 
  
GINId  Gini Coefficient, Disposable Income, 2009    SWIID 
EconGBZ Economic Globalization, Actual Flows, 2009 KOF 
Int Interaction term for the II and SPI See Below 
 
 
Institutional Index 
The Institutional Index is a composite index that combines measures of the protection of property 
rights, civil liberties, political rights, and the rule of law. This range of variables is heavily supported by 
the available literature and effectively represents those institutions which are most conducive to 
organizing productive economic activity. While there exists some conceptual overlap between these 
measures, for example the rule of law and civil rights, these metrics do not conflict with each other. These 
metrics are combined into an index that equally weights each component and generates a mean score for 
each state that ranges from 1 to 100.  
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Table A3: Institutional Index 
Variable Description Source 
Property 
Rights 
“assesses the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to acquire, hold, 
and utilize private property, secured by clear laws that the government enforces effectively” 
(Heritage Foundation).  
EFI 
Political 
Rights 
A composite measure of the presence and quality of electoral processes, political pluralism 
and participation, and government function. 
FIW 
Civil 
Liberties 
A composite measure of the presence and quality of the freedom of belief and expression, , the 
rule of law, personal autonomy, and associational, organizational, and individual rights  
FIW 
Rule of 
Law 
Evaluates the question: “To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, 
impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials 
comply with the law?” (Varieties of Democracy). 
VDEM 
 
Structural Policy Index 
A composite index composed of the following indicators from the EoB dataset: Starting a 
Business, Construction Permits, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Minority Investors, 
Paying Taxes, Trading Across Borders, Enforcing Contracts, and Resolving Insolvency. All indicators 
range from 1 to 100 and were weighted equally. The SPI represents the mean score across all indicators. 
The SPI ranges from a possible score of 1 to a possible score of 100.  
Table A4: Structural Policy Index 
Variable Description Source 
Starting a 
Business             
How easy it is to legally start a business, as a function of time, cost, procedures, and the 
minimum capital required. 
EoB 
Construction 
Permits 
The cost of construction permits and building, how easy it is to apply for construction 
permits, and how long it takes to complete construction projects as a function of 
additional inspections and building regulations.  
EoB 
Registering 
Property           
How long it takes to transfer property titles between two parties, the cost of this 
procedure, and what bureaucratic procedures are required to register or transfer property 
EoB 
Getting  
Credit   
The accessibility of credit for entrepreneurs as a function of regulations on loans and 
collateral, as well as the depth and quality of credit information for creditors and 
debtors.  
EoB 
Protecting 
Minority  
Investors           
  
The degree of regulation and accountability for corporations and their directors, such 
that minority shareholders can safely invest without fear of their investment being 
improperly appropriated. It also measures the quality of legal dispute resolution 
mechanisms that protect minority investors. 
EoB 
Paying Taxes    How easy it is to pay taxes, by the time it takes to prepare and file  
returns, the cost of paying taxes, and the number of payments required yearly.  
EoB 
Trading  
Across Borders 
How easy it is to trade across borders, as a function of what documents are required to 
export or import, how long it takes to export or import, and the cost of doing so.  
EoB 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
How long it takes to adjudicate a contractual dispute in court, the cost of litigation, and 
the procedures required to file, argue, and obtain a verdict on a case.  
EoB 
Resolving 
Insolvency        
The speed, cost, and effectiveness of bankruptcy proceedings, such that businesses and 
assets are efficiently liquidated and allocated to creditors.  
EoB 
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Appendix B: Sample of States 
  
Table B1: Sample of States 
1 Albania 22 Ecuador 43 Malaysia 64 Senegal 
2 Algeria 23 El Salvador 44 Maldives 65 Serbia 
3 Angola 24 Ethiopia 45 Mali 66 Seychelles 
4 Argentina 25 Fiji 46 Mauritania 67 Sierra Leone 
5 Armenia 26 Gabon 47 Mauritius 68 Solomon Islands 
6 Belarus 27 Georgia 48 Mongolia 69 South Africa 
7 Benin 28 Ghana 49 Montenegro 70 Sri Lanka 
8 Bhutan 29 Guatemala 50 Morocco 71 Suriname 
9 Botswana 30 Guinea 51 Mozambique 72 Thailand 
10 Bulgaria 31 Guinea-Bissau 52 Namibia 73 Timor-Leste 
11 Burkina Faso 32 Haiti 53 Nepal 74 Togo 
12 Burundi 33 Honduras 54 Nicaragua 75 Tunisia 
13 Cambodia 34 Jamaica 55 Niger 76 Turkey 
14 Cameroon 34 Jordan 56 Panama 77 Uganda 
15 Chad 36 Kazakhstan 57 Papua New Guinea 78 Ukraine 
16 Chile 37 Kenya 58 Paraguay 79 Uruguay 
17 Colombia 38 Lebanon 59 Peru 80 Vanuatu 
18 Comoros 39 Lesotho 60 Philippines 81 Zambia 
19 Costa Rica 40 Liberia 61 Poland 82 Zimbabwe 
20 Croatia 41 Madagascar 62 Romania 
  
21 Djibouti 42 Malawi 63 Rwanda 
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Appendix C: Stepwise Analysis 
Table C1: Institutional Index Components: Initial Results  
Variable Estimate Standard Error P-value VIF Adjusted R Squared 
Intercept -3636.32 1428.66 0.0129* NA 0.3207 
RLaw 36.61 26.25 0.1672 2.738 
 
CL 226.45 88.85 0.0128* 6.703 
 
PR -158.71 96.94 0.1057 6.336 
 
Prop 57.81 33.88 0.0920● 1.622 
 
Notes: N = 82. Standard Errors in parentheses. ●, *, **, and *** correspond with p-values at the 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, and 
0.001 significance levels, respectively.  
 
Table C2: Institutional Index Components: Final Results  
Variable Estimate Standard Error P-value VIF Adjusted R Squared 
Intercept -3242.59 1341.47 0.01795* NA 0.3055 
CL 140.23 39.64 0.00068*** 1.305 
 
Prop 82.25 30.73 0.00905** 1.305 
 
Notes: N = 82. Standard Errors in parentheses. ●, *, **, and *** correspond with p-values at the 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, and 
0.001 significance levels, respectively.  
 
Table C3: Structural Policy Index Components: Initial Results  
Variable Estimate Standard Error P-value VIF Adjusted R Squared 
Intercept -6456.55 2512.51 0.0125* NA 0.3361 
Biz 25.94 27.22 0.3437 1.97 
 
Con -8.03 24.27 0.7418 1.10 
 
RProp 0.66 25.98 0.9798 1.64 
 
Cred 33.19 22.99 0.1531 2.16 
 
PMI 7.76 33.11 0.8155 1.77 
 
PayTax 13.75 21.27 0.5200 1.19 
 
TRD 60.30 20.31 0.0041** 1.27 
 
EC 61.78 37.26 0.1017 1.67 
 
RI 16.19 28.78 0.5754 1.65 
 
Notes: N = 82. Standard Errors in parentheses. ●, *, **, and *** correspond with p-values at the 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, and 
0.001 significance levels, respectively.  
 
Table C4: Structural Policy Index Components: Initial Results  
Variable Estimate Standard Error P-value VIF Adjusted R Squared 
Intercept -5686.96 1814.86 0.0024** NA 0.3605 
Cred 45.62 17.84 0.0129* 1.37 
 
TRD 68.20 18.78 0.0005*** 1.13 
 
EC 83.62 31.26 0.0091** 1.22 
 
Notes: N = 82. Standard Errors in parentheses. ●, *, **, and *** correspond with p-values at the 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, and 
0.001 significance levels, respectively.  
